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1976] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ported statement that the absence of cross-claims from the lan-
guage of CPLR 203(c) was a result of "legislative oversight,"48 is
weak support for such a significant modification of the statute.
Moreover, rather than avoiding a multiplicity of suits, the exten-
sion of CPLR 203(c) actually will increase the burden on the court
system by permitting a new class of time-barred claims to be re-
vived in extended trials.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(b): Matrimonial domicile basis ofjurisdiction strictly construed.
CPLR 302(b) allows a court, in certain circumstances, to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident or nondomiciliary
defendant in an action brought by a New York domiciliary or
resident seeking support or alimony. 49 One situation in which the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is permitted by the statute is where
New York was "the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their
asserted? What if the first cross-claim is time barred, and yet relates to the events under
consideration in the main action? Although Seligson involves a major change in New York
procedural law, the court apparently gave no consideration to these and similar problems.
48 50 App. Div. 2d at 210, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
49 CPLR 302(b) provides:
A court in any matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a demand
for support or alimony may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent or
defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she is no longer a resident or
domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if the party
seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time such demand is
made, provided that this state was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before
their separation, or the defendant abandoned the plaintiff in this state, or the
obligation to pay support or alimony or alimony [sic] accrued under the laws of this
state or under an agreement executed in this state.
The statute was enacted by the legislature in 1974. Ch. 859, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1339
(McKinney). Such an amendment to New York's long-arm statute became increasingly
necessary as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287 (1942), wherein the Court held that an ex parte divorce is entitled to full faith and credit
if one spouse is domiciled in the divorce forum. Williams thus enabled one spouse to
abandon the other by moving out of state, establish domicile in a state with liberal divorce
laws in order to obtain an ex parte divorce, while at the same time remaining immune from
any claim for support, such demand being considered an action in personam requiring
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. See Renaudin v. Renaudin, 37 App.
Div. 2d 183, 323 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dep't 1971). In most cases, attempts to acquire personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant-spouses by use of the traditional long-arm statute,
CPLR 302(a), have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Whitaker, 32 App. Div. 2d 595,
299 N.Y.S.2d 482 (3d Dep't 1969); Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 28 App. Div. 2d 117, 282
N.Y.S.2d 36 (2d Dep't 1967); Baum v. Baum, 62 Misc. 2d 305, 307 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1970); Inkelas v. Inkelas, 58 Misc. 2d 340, 295 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1968). New York has enacted the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, DRL §§ 30
el seq., under which a New York petitioner may bring a proceeding to compel support from a
respondent residing in a state having substantially similar or reciprocal laws. The Uniform
Law, however, is inapplicable to ex-spouses.
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separation. '50 In Lieb v. Lieb,5 1 the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, strictly construed this language, holding that the provi-
sion permits personal jurisdiction only where New York was the
matrimonial domicile "either shortly before or at the moment just
prior to their separation. 52
Plaintiff-wife, a New York resident, brought suit against her
husband for, among other things, support.53 Married in New York,
the parties resided there for 14 years before moving to Virginia,
where they lived for 12 years. In 1969, plaintiff, after being aban-
doned by the defendant in Virginia, returned to New York and
subsequently commenced the instant action for support. Defen-
dant, who was served via registered mail at his current residence in
Nice, France, moved for dismissal, alleging that the court lacked in
personam jurisdiction. The motion was granted by the Supreme
Court, Queens County, 54 and plaintiff-wife appealed.
Plaintiff contended that the jurisdictional requirements of
CPLR 302(b) were satisfied, inasmuch as New York had been the
matrimonial domicile of the parties at one time during the mar-
riage. The appellate division was thus called upon to determine
whether the legislature intended that the parties must live in New
York at or shortly before the time of separation, or if maintenance
of a New York domicile at any time during the marriage would be
sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction.5 5 Concluding that CPLR
302(b) requires that New York have been the matrimonial domicile
of the parties within the near past, if not immediately prior to the
separation, the court affirmed the dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction.5 6 In the opinion of the court, "[i]t would be wholly
contrary to the limited nature of the three alternative grounds for
personal jurisdiction established under [CPLR 302(b)]"57 if another
result had been reached. The appellate division was convinced that
50 CPLR 302(b).
51 53 App. Div. 2d 67, 385 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1976).
52 Id. at 69, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (emphasis in original).
" The plaintiff also sought to attach defendant husband's Civil Service and United
States Army pension and annuities, and to recover counsel fees. Id. at 68, 385 N.Y.S.2d at
570.
86 Misc. 2d 75, 381 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976).
The ambiguity of the phrase "matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separa-
tion" was one of the problems anticipated by Dean McLaughlin in his commentary to the
CPLR after enactment of § 302(b). See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 17 (Supp.
1975). See also 1 WK&M 302.19, at 3-137.
*s 53 App. Div. 2d at 75, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
57 Id. at 70, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 571. The three alternative grounds for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(b) include abandonment within the State; an obliga-
tion to pay support or alimony arising under New York law; or, an obligation to support or
pay alimony arising under an agreement executed in New York. See note 49 supra.
[Vol. 50:771
1976] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the language of CPLR 302(b) indicated no legislative intent to allow
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant-spouse
merely because the parties' matrimonial domicile was in New York
at some point during the marriage. After examining the long-arm
matrimonial action statutes enacted in several other states, 58 the
court concluded that although the statutes examined were dissimi-
lar in language to CPLR 302(b), 59 none were broad enough to
invoke personal jurisdiction in a case with facts similar to Lieb.
Based on all these considerations, the court felt obliged to strictly
construe the language "before their separation. 60
In its narrow approach to the phrase in issue, the Lieb court
seems to have overlooked the intent surrounding the enactment of
CPLR 302(b), i.e., to make it more difficult for a spouse to flee
from marital responsibilities. The court failed to consider the
State's interest in keeping abandoned spouses off the welfare
rolls. 6 1 Moreover, the appellate division's ruling may result in
somewhat inconsistent applications of the provisions of CPLR
302(b). It should be noted that mere abandonment within the State
constitutes a sufficient fundamental contact upon which to predi-
cate jurisdiction.62 Thus, a spouse who establishes a New York
-1 Interestingly, the court indicated that only five other states have passed statutes
exclusively designed to confer long-arm jurisdiction in matrimonial actions. In actuality,
some 10 states, aside from New York, have similar provisions. See IDAHO CODE § 5-514(e)
(Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1968); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-308(b)(8) (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 14.065(2)(e) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16(A)(5)
(Supp. 1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4.3(A)(8) (Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1701.03(a)(7) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(6) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 247.057 (Supp. 1975); IND. TRIAL R. 4.4(A)(7). For a discussion of the trend towards the
enactment of legislation of this type, see Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody
Cases, 73 COLuM. L. REv. 289 (1973).
59 53 App. Div. 2d at 72-75, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 572-74.60 Id. It would appear that Dean McLaughlin would disagree with the Lieb decision. In
his commentary to the CPLR, he noted that there might be some problem in interpreting the
phrase in issue in Lieb. He gave an example to illustrate his point which contained facts
somewhat analogous to those in Lieb, except that the parties in Dean McLaughlin's fact
pattern were not even married in New York. Nonetheless, he felt that "[a] literal reading of
the statute would support the conclusion that the wife could obtain alimony in a New York
divorce action," and indicated that he would "be comfortable with this result." Dean
McLaughlin correctly predicted, however, that the courts would not be likely to agree with
him immediately. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at 17 (Supp. 1975).
01 It has been asserted by Dean McLaughlin that the plaintiff's residence in New York in
conjunction with the State's interest in seeing the plaintiff adequately supported should
alone be enough to satisfy the minimum contacts test used to determine the constitutionality
of a long-arm enactment such as CPLR 302(b). 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, commentary at
16, 17 (Supp. 1975). See 1 WK&M 302.19, at 3-137.
1 See note 49 supra. In Lieb, the supreme court felt that abandonment in New York
established a "very fundamental contact" with the State. 86 Misc. 2d at 78, 381 N.Y.S.2d at
760. However, it has been questioned whether abandonment actually does afford sufficient
minimum contacts with the State to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. See 1
WK&M 302.19, at 3-138.
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residence after being abandoned during a temporary sojourn in
New York seemingly can successfully sue for support and invoke in
personam jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(b). In contrast, a
party who was married in New York and resided here for several
years before establishing a matrimonial domicile elsewhere cannot,
without more, obtain personal jurisdiction in this State under the
statute.
A suggested solution to this anomalous situation is judicial or
legislative construction of a formula, based on the length of time
the parties maintained their matrimonial domicile in New York, to
decide whether sufficient fundamental contacts with this State exist
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. In the absence of such a formula, decisions based on
the Lieb interpretation may serve to promote injustice rather than
prevent it.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3218(d): Execution of confession ofjudgment by an agent held to be
binding against personal assets of indebted partners.
CPLR 3218(d) permits one or more joint debtors to confess
judgment on a joint debt.63 Although such a judgment may be
entered and enforced solely against the personal assets of the
confessing debtor,64 execution of a judgment against less than all
63 CPLR 3218(d) provides:
One or more joint debtors may confess a judgment for a joint debt due or to
become due. Where all the joint debtors do not unite in the confession, the
judgment shall be entered and enforced against only those who confessed it and it is
not a bar to an action against the other joint debtors upon the same demand.
CPLR 3218 permits a debtor to confess judgment for a present or future monetary
debt. Such confessions have two primary purposes: First, they act as a "short cut to judgment
where the defendant concedes liability," and wishes to avoid the time and expense of a civil
action, 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1036 (1970); and, second, they serve as
a security device for the protection of creditors' claims, even before a debt is due. See id.; 10
CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 68:1, at 214-15 (1966); 4 WK&M T 3218.01. If the entire debt is not
due at the time of confession, the judgment is enforceable against only that portion of the
obligation which has matured. The judgment, however, remains in effect and acts as security
for the monies due subsequent to the initial entry and execution of the judgment. CPLR
3218(c); see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1036 (1970).
Procedurally, to confess judgment, the debtor must execute an affidavit stating the
amount due, authorizing the entry of judgment, and describing the factual situation in
which the debt arose. CPLR 3218(a)(1)-(2). The affidavit must also state "the county where
the [defendant-debtor] resides, or if he is a nonresident, the county in which entry [of
judgment] is authorized." CPLR 3218(a)(1). Once the affidavit is executed, the creditor has 3
years to enter judgment. The 3-year period may, however, be shortened by the death of the
defendant-debtor. CPLR 3218(b). For a detailed discussion of the confession of judgment
procedure, see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1039-45 (1970).
64 See, e.g., Schenson v. I. Shainin & Co., 243 App. Div. 638, 276 N.Y.S. 881 (2d Dep't)
(per curiam), aff'd mem., 268 N.Y. 567, 198 N.E. 407 (1935) (judgment against nonexecuting
